The one-dimensional Euclidean domain: Finitely many obstructions are not
  enough by Chen, Jiehua et al.
ar
X
iv
:1
50
6.
03
83
8v
1 
 [c
s.G
T]
  1
1 J
un
 20
15
The one-dimensional Euclidean domain:
Finitely many obstructions are not enough
Jiehua Chen∗ Kirk R. Pruhs† Gerhard J. Woeginger‡
Abstract
We show that one-dimensional Euclidean preference profiles can not be characterized
in terms of finitely many forbidden substructures. This result is in strong contrast to the
case of single-peaked and single-crossing preference profiles, for which such finite charac-
terizations have been derived in the literature.
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1 Introduction
Single-peakedness, single-crossingness, and one-dimensional Euclideanness are popular do-
main restrictions that show up in a variety of models in the social sciences and economics. In
many situations, these domain restrictions guarantee the existence of a desirable entity that
would not exist without the restriction, as for instance a strategy-proof collective choice rule,
or a Condorcet winner, or an equilibrium point.
• Preferences are single-peaked, if there exists a linear ordering of the alternatives such
that any voter’s preference relation along this ordering is either always increasing, always
decreasing, or first increasing and then decreasing.
• Preferences are single-crossing, if there exists a linear ordering of the voters such that
for any pair of alternatives along this ordering, there is a single spot where the voters
switch from preferring one alternative above the other one.
• Preferences are one-dimensional Euclidean, if there exists a common embedding of voters
and alternatives into the real numbers, such that every voter prefers alternatives that
are embedded close to him to alternatives that are embedded farther away from him.
Single-peakedness goes back to the seminal work of Black [4]; among many other nice
consequences, single-peakedness implies transitivity (Inada [22]) and non-manipulability of
the majority rule (Moulin [30]).
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Single-crossingness goes back to the work of Karlin [23] in applied mathematics; Mirrlees
[29] and Roberts [31] apply it in the theory of optimal income taxation, and Diamond &
Stiglitz [11] use it in the economics of uncertainty. Single-crossingness also plays a role in
coalition formation (Demange [10]; Kung [25]), income redistribution (Meltzer & Richard [28]),
local public goods and stratification (Westhoff [32]; Epple & Platt [15]), in the choice of
constitutional voting rules (Barbera` & Jackson [2]), and in the analysis of the majority rule
(Grandmont [19]; Gans & Smart [18]).
One-dimensional Euclidean preference structures go back to Hotelling [21]. They have
been discussed by Coombs [9] under the name ‘unidimensional unfolding’ representations, and
they unite all the good properties of single-peaked and single-crossing preference structures.
Doignon & Falmagne [12] discuss Euclidean preference structures in the context of behavioral
sciences, and Brams, Jones & Kilgour [6] discuss them in the context of coalition formation.
Obstructions. The scientific literature contains many characterizations of combinatorial
objects in terms of forbidden substructures or obstructions. For instance, Kuratowski’s the-
orem [26] characterizes planar graphs in terms of two obstructions: a graph is planar if
and only if it does not contain a subdivided K5 or K3,3. In a similar spirit, Lekkerkerker
& Boland [27] characterize interval graphs through five (infinite) families of forbidden in-
duced subgraphs, and Fo¨ldes & Hammer characterize split graphs in terms of three forbidden
induced subgraphs. Hoffman, Kolen & Sakarovitch [20] characterize totally-balanced 0-1-
matrices in terms of certain forbidden submatrices. The characterizations of split graphs and
totally-balanced 0-1-matrices use a finite number of obstructions, while the characterizations
of planar graphs and interval graphs both involve infinitely many obstructions. In the area
of social choice, Ballester & Haeringer [1] characterize single-peaked preference profiles and
group-separable preference profiles in terms of a small finite number of obstructions. Also
single-crossing preference profiles allow a characterization by finitely many obstructions; see
Bredereck, Chen & Woeginger [7].
A characterization by finitely many obstructions has many positive consequences. When-
ever a family F of combinatorial objects allows such a finite characterization, this directly
implies the existence of a polynomial time algorithm for recognizing the members of F : one
may simply work through the obstructions one by one, and check whether the considered
object contains the obstruction. By looking deeper into the combinatorial structure of such
families F , one usually manages to find recognition algorithms that are much faster than this
simple approach. As an example, there exist sophisticated algorithms for recognizing single-
peaked preference profiles that are due to Bartholdi & Trick [3], Doignon & Falmagne [12],
and Escoffier, Lang & O¨ztu¨rk [16]. Also single-crossingness can be recognized very efficiently;
see Doignon & Falmagne [12], Elkind, Faliszewski & Slinko [13], and Bredereck, Chen &
Woeginger [7].
As another positive consequence, a characterization by finitely many obstructions often
helps us in understanding the algorithmic and combinatorial behavior of family F . For ex-
ample, Bredereck, Chen & Woeginger [8] investigate the problem of deciding whether a given
preference profile is close to a nicely structured preference profile. The distance is measured
by the number of voters or alternatives that have to be deleted from the given profile so as to
reach a nicely structured profile. For the cases where ‘nicely structured’ means single-peaked
or single-crossing, the proofs in [8] are heavily based on characterizations [1, 7] by finitely
many obstructions. Elkind & Lackner [14] study similar questions and derive approximation
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algorithms for the number of deleted voters or alternatives. All results in [14] are centered
around preference profiles that can be characterized by a finite number of obstructions, and
some of the theorems are parameterized by the obstruction set.
Scope and contribution of this paper. As the one-dimensional Euclidean profiles form a
special case of single-peaked and single-crossing profiles (see Section 2.3 for more information
on this), every obstruction to single-peakedness and every obstruction to single-crossingness
will automatically also form an obstruction to one-dimensional Euclideanness. Now the ques-
tion arises: “Are there any further obstructions to one-dimensional Euclideanness?” To which
Clyde Coombs [9] answered back in 1964: “Yes, there are!” (again, see Section 2.3 for more
information). This immediately takes us to another question: “Is there a characterization of
one-dimensional Euclideanness in terms of finitely many obstructions?” The answer to this
second question is negative, as we are going to show in this paper.
To this end, we construct an infinite sequence of preference profiles that satisfy two crucial
properties. First, none of these profiles is one-dimensional Euclidean. Secondly, every pro-
file just barely violates one-dimensional Euclideanness, as the deletion of an arbitrary voter
immediately makes the profile one-dimensional Euclidean. The second property implies that
each profile in the sequence is on the edge of being Euclidean, and that the reason for its non-
Euclideanness must lie in its overall structure. In other words each of these infinitely many
profiles yields a separate obstruction for one-dimensional Euclideanness, and this is exactly
what we want to establish.
The definition of the infinite profile sequence and the resulting analysis are quite involved.
Ironically, the complexity of our proof is a consequence of the very statement we are going to
prove. As part of our proof, we have to argue that the deletion of an arbitrary voter from an
arbitrary profile in the sequence yields a one-dimensional Euclidean profile. Now if there was
a characterization of one-dimensional Euclideanness by finitely many obstructions, then this
argument would be relatively easy to get through: we could simply analyze the preference
structure and show that the deletion of any voter removes all obstructions. But unfortunately,
such a characterization does not exist. The only viable (and fairly tedious) approach is to
explicitly specify the corresponding Euclidean representations (one representation per deleted
voter!) and to prove by case distinctions that each such representation correctly encodes the
preferences of all the remaining voters.
Organization of the paper. In Section 2 we summarize the central definitions, state
useful observations, and provide some examples. In Section 3 we formulate our main results
in Theorems 3.1 and 3.2, and we show how Theorem 3.2 follows from Theorem 3.1. The five
Sections 4 through 8 present the long and technical proof of Theorem 3.1. Section 9 completes
the paper with a short discussion.
2 Definitions, notations, and examples
Let 1, . . . ,m be m alternatives and let v1, . . . , vn be n voters. A preference profile specifies
the preference orderings of the voters, where voter vi ranks the alternatives according to a
strict linear order ≻i. For alternatives a and b, the relation a ≻i b means that voter vi strictly
prefers a to b. If the meaning is clear from the context, we will sometimes simply write ≻
3
instead of ≻i and suppress the dependence on i. A profile with n voters and m alternatives
will be called an n×m profile.
2.1 Single-peaked profiles
A linear ordering of the alternatives is single-peaked with respect to a fixed voter vi, if the
preferences of vi taken along this ordering have a single local maximum. A preference profile
is single-peaked, if it allows an ordering of the alternatives that is single-peaked with respect
to every voter.
Note that for every single-peaked permutation π(1), π(2), . . . , π(m) of the alternatives,
also the reverse permutation π(m), . . . , π(2), π(1) is single-peaked. The following proposition
states a characterization of single-peakedness in terms of finitely many obstructions.
Proposition 2.1 (Ballester & Haeringer [1])
A preference profile is single-peaked, if and only if it avoids the following two obstructions.
The first obstruction is a 3× 3 profile with alternatives a, b, c:
Voter v1: {b, c} ≻1 a
Voter v2: {a, c} ≻2 b
Voter v3: {a, b} ≻3 c
The second obstruction is a 2× 4 profile with alternatives a, b, c, d:
Voter v1: a ≻1 b ≻1 c and d ≻1 b
Voter v2: c ≻2 b ≻2 a and d ≻2 b
2.2 Single-crossing profiles
A linear ordering of the voters is single-crossing with respect to two alternatives a and b, if
the ordered list of voters can be partitioned into an initial piece and a final piece such that
all voters in the initial piece have the same relative ranking of a and b, while all voters in
the final piece rank them in the opposite way. A preference profile is single-crossing, if it
allows an ordering of the voters that is single-crossing with respect to every possible pair of
alternatives.
The following proposition states a characterization of single-crossingness in terms of finitely
many obstructions.
Proposition 2.2 (Bredereck, Chen & Woeginger [7])
A preference profile is single-crossing, if and only if it avoids the following two obstructions.
The first obstruction is a 3× 6 profile with (not necessarily distinct) alternatives a, b, c, d, e, f :
Voter v1: b ≻1 a and c ≻1 d and e ≻1 f
Voter v2: a ≻2 b and d ≻2 c and e ≻2 f
Voter v3: a ≻3 b and c ≻3 d and f ≻3 e
The second obstruction is a 4× 4 profile with (not necessarily distinct) alternatives a, b, c, d:
Voter v1: a ≻1 b and c ≻1 d
Voter v2: a ≻2 b and d ≻2 c
Voter v3: b ≻3 a and c ≻3 d
Voter v4: b ≻4 a and d ≻4 c
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2.3 One-dimensional Euclidean profiles
Consider a common embedding of the voters and alternatives into the real number line, that
assigns to every alternative j a real number E[j] and that assigns to every voter vi a real
number F [i]. A preference profile is one-dimensional Euclidean, if there exists such a common
Euclidean representation of the voters and alternatives, such that for every voter vi and for
every pair a and b of alternatives, a ≻i b holds if and only if the distance from F [i] to E[a]
is strictly smaller than the distance from F [i] to E[b]. In other words, small spatial distances
from the point F [i] indicate strong preferences of voter vi.
It is well-known (and easy to see) that every one-dimensional Euclidean profile is simulta-
neously single-peaked and single-crossing: the left-to-right ordering of the alternatives along
the Euclidean representation is single-peaked, and the left-to-right ordering of the voters along
the Euclidean representation is single-crossing. Coombs [9, page 91] discusses a 16 × 6 pref-
erence profile that is both single-peaked and single-crossing, but fails to be one-dimensional
Euclidean. The following example contains the smallest profile known to us that has these
intriguing properties.
Example 2.3 Consider the following 3×6 profile P (for the sake of readability, the preference
orders are simply listed left to right from most preferred to least preferred alternative):
Voter v1: 3 2 1 4 5 6
Voter v2: 3 4 2 5 6 1
Voter v3: 5 4 3 6 2 1
This profile P is single-peaked with respect to the ordering 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 of alternatives, and it
is single-crossing with respect to the ordering v1, v2, v3 of voters. Furthermore it can be shown
by case distinctions that P is not one-dimensional Euclidean.
As the profile in Example 2.3 is single-peaked and single-crossing, it does not contain
any of the obstructions listed in Propositions 2.1 and 2.2. Hence there must be some other
obstruction contained in it, that is responsible for its non-Euclideanness. Example 2.3 and the
16 × 6 profile of Coombs provide first indications that the obstructions for one-dimensional
Euclideanness might be complex and intricate to analyze.
The following two propositions state simple observations that will be used repeatedly in
our arguments.
Proposition 2.4 Let a and b be two alternatives in a Euclidean embedding (E,F ) of some
profile with E[a] < E[b]. Then voter vi prefers a to b if and only if F [i] <
1
2
(E[a] +E[b]), and
he prefers b to a if and only if F [i] > 1
2
(E[a] +E[b]).
Proposition 2.5 Let a, b, c be three alternatives in a Euclidean embedding (E,F ) of some
preference profile with E[a] < E[b] < E[c].
• If voter vi prefers a ≻i b, then he also prefers b ≻i c.
• If voter vi prefers c ≻i b, then he also prefers b ≻i a.
Finally, we mention that the (mathematical) literature on one-dimensional Euclidean pref-
erence profiles is scarce. Doignon & Falmagne [12] and Knoblauch [24] design polynomial time
algorithms for deciding whether a given preference profile has a one-dimensional Euclidean
representation. The approaches in [12, 24] are not purely combinatorial, as they are partially
based on linear programming formulations.
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3 Statement of the main results
In this section we formulate the two (closely related) main results of this paper. The first
result is technical and states the existence of infinitely many non-Euclidean profiles that are
minimal with respect to voter deletion.
Theorem 3.1 For any integer k ≥ 2, there exists a preference profile P∗k with n = 2k voters
and m = 4k alternatives, such that the following holds.
(a) Profile P∗k is not one-dimensional Euclidean.
(b) Profile P∗k is minimal in the following sense: the deletion of an arbitrary voter from P
∗
k
yields a one-dimensional Euclidean profile.
The proof of Theorem 3.1 is long and will fill most of the rest of this paper. Here is a
quick overview of this proof: Section 4 describes the profiles P∗k . Section 5 shows that every
profile P∗k satisfies property (a) in Theorem 3.1, while the three Sections 6 through 8 establish
property (b). Section 6 defines the underlying Euclidean representations, Section 7 lists a
number of technical auxiliary statements, and Section 8 establishes the correctness of the
Euclidean representations.
As an immediate consequence of Theorem 3.1, we derive our second main result (which
essentially repeats the title of the paper) in the following theorem.
Theorem 3.2 One-dimensional Euclidean preference profiles can not be characterized in
terms of finitely many obstructions.
Proof. Suppose for the sake of contradiction that such a characterization with finitely many
obstructions would exist. Let t denote the largest number of voters in any obstruction, and
consider a profile P∗k from Theorem 3.1 with k ≥ t. As P
∗
k is not one-dimensional Euclidean
by property (a), it must contain one of these finitely many obstructions with at most t voters.
Fix such an obstruction. As profile P∗k contains 2k > t + 1 voters, one of its voters is not
involved in the obstruction. If we delete this voter, the resulting profile will still contain the
obstruction; hence it is not one-dimensional Euclidean, which contradicts property (b). 
4 Definition of the profiles
In this section we start the proof of Theorem 3.1 by defining the underlying profiles P∗k . The
properties (a) and (b) stated in Theorem 3.1 will be established in the following sections.
We consider n = 2k voters called v1, v2, . . . , v2k together with m = 4k alternatives called
1, 2, 3, . . . , 4k. The preference orderings of the voters will be pasted together from the following
preference pieces Xi, Yi, Zi with 1 ≤ i ≤ k.
Xi := 2k + 2i− 2 ≻ 2k + 2i− 3 ≻ 2k + 2i− 4 ≻ . . . ≻ 2i+ 2
Yi := 2i− 2 ≻ 2i− 3 ≻ 2i− 4 ≻ . . . ≻ 1
Zi := 2k + 2i+ 1 ≻ 2k + 2i+ 2 ≻ 2k + 2i+ 3 ≻ . . . ≻ 4k
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Note that for every i = 1, . . . , k, the corresponding three pieces Xi, Yi, Zi cover contiguous
intervals of respectively 2k − 3, 2i − 2, 2k − 2i alternatives. Hence these three pieces jointly
cover 4k − 5 of the alternatives, and only the five alternatives in the set
Ui = {2i− 1, 2i, 2i+ 1} ∪ {2k + 2i− 1, 2k + 2i}
remain uncovered. Note furthermore that the pieces Y1 and Zk are empty. Now let us define
the preference orderings of the voters. The two voters v2i−1 and v2i always form a couple with
fairly similar preferences. For 1 ≤ i ≤ k − 1, these voters v2i−1 and v2i have the following
preferences:
v2i−1 : Xi ≻ 2i+ 1 ≻ 2k + 2i− 1 ≻ 2i ≻ 2i− 1 ≻ 2k + 2i ≻ Yi ≻ Zi (1a)
v2i : Xi ≻ 2k + 2i− 1 ≻ 2k + 2i ≻ 2i+ 1 ≻ 2i ≻ 2i− 1 ≻ Yi ≻ Zi. (1b)
Note that the voters v2i−1 and v2i both rank the three alternatives 2i + 1, 2i, 2i − 1 in Ui in
the same decreasing order, with the two other alternatives 2k + 2i − 1 and 2k + 2i shuffled
into that order. The last two voters v2k−1 and v2k are defined separately:
v2k−1 : Xk ≻ 2k + 1 ≻ 4k − 1 ≻ 2k ≻ 2k − 1 ≻ 4k ≻ Yk (2a)
v2k : Xk ≻ 2k + 1 ≻ 2k ≻ . . . . . . ≻ 3 ≻ 2 ≻ 4k − 1 ≻ 4k ≻ 1 (2b)
Since piece Zk is empty, the preferences of voter v2k−1 in (2a) actually run in parallel with the
preferences of the other odd-index voters v2i−1 with 1 ≤ i ≤ k− 1 in (1a). The last voter v2k,
however, behaves very differently from the other even-index voters: on top of his preference
list are the alternatives in piece Xk, followed by an intermingling of the alternatives in piece
Yk and set Uk (first the alternatives 2k + 1, . . . , 2 in decreasing order, and then the three
alternatives 4k − 1, 4k, and 1).
Example 4.1 For k = 4, the preference profile P∗
4
has n = 8 voters and m = 16 alternatives
and looks as follows (all preference orders are listed left to right from most preferred to least
preferred alternative):
v1 : 8 7 6 5 4 3 9 2 1 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
v2 : 8 7 6 5 4 9 10 3 2 1 11 12 13 14 15 16
v3 : 10 9 8 7 6 5 11 4 3 12 2 1 13 14 15 16
v4 : 10 9 8 7 6 11 12 5 4 3 2 1 13 14 15 16
v5 : 12 11 10 9 8 7 13 6 5 14 4 3 2 1 15 16
v6 : 12 11 10 9 8 13 14 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 15 16
v7 : 14 13 12 11 10 9 15 8 7 16 6 5 4 3 2 1
v8 : 14 13 12 11 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 15 16 1
The alternatives in the five leftmost columns form the pieces Xi. In the first seven rows, the
five middle columns correspond to the sets Ui, while the remaining six columns belong to pieces
Yi and Zi. The last row illustrates the extraordinary behavior of the last voter v8. 
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5 The profiles are not Euclidean
In this section, we will discuss single-crossing, single-peaked and one-dimensional Euclidean
properties of the profiles P∗k . First, it can readily be seen that every profile P
∗
k with k ≥ 2 is
single-crossing with respect to the ordering v1, v2, . . . , v2k−2, v2k, v2k−1 of the voters (that is,
the natural ordering of voters by increasing index, but with the last two voters v2k−1 and v2k
swapped). As this single-crossing property is of no relevance for our further considerations,
the simple proof is omitted. Next, let us turn to single-peakedness.
Lemma 5.1 For k ≥ 2, the profile P∗k is single-peaked. Furthermore, the only two single-
peaked orderings of the alternatives are the increasing ordering 1, 2, 3, . . . , 4k and the decreas-
ing ordering 4k, . . . , 3, 2, 1.
Proof. Every voter v2i−1 and v2i with 1 ≤ i ≤ k has alternative 2k + 2i − 2 as his top
preference. Furthermore, he ranks the small alternatives 1, 2, . . . , 2k+2i− 2 decreasingly and
he ranks the large alternatives 2k + 2i− 2, 2k + 2i − 1, . . . , 4k increasingly. Hence P∗k indeed
is single-peaked with respect to 1, 2, 3, . . . , 4k and 4k, . . . , 3, 2, 1.
Next consider an arbitrary single-peaked permutation π(1), π(2), . . . , π(4k) of the alterna-
tives. Since 4k and 1 are the least preferred choices of voters v1 and v2k, these two alternatives
must be extremal in the single-peaked ordering; by symmetry we will assume π(1) = 1 and
π(4k) = 4k.
• Voter v1 ranks 1 ≻ 2k + 2 ≻ 2k + 3 ≻ . . . ≻ 4k, without other alternatives ranked
inbetween. This implies π(x) = x for 2k + 2 ≤ x ≤ 4k.
• Voter v2k−1 ranks 2k + 2 ≻ 2k + 1 ≻ 2k ≻ . . . ≻ 3 ≻ 2 ≻ 1. This now implies π(x) = x
also for the alternatives x with 1 ≤ x ≤ 2k + 1.
Summarizing, we have π(x) = x for all x, and this completes the proof. 
The following lemma shows that every profile P∗k satisfies property (a) of Theorem 3.1.
Lemma 5.2 For k ≥ 2, the profile P∗k is not one-dimensional Euclidean.
Proof. We suppose for the sake of contradiction that profile P∗k is one-dimensional Euclidean.
Let F [j] for j = 1, . . . , 2k and E[i] for i = 1, . . . , 4k denote a corresponding Euclidean represen-
tation of the voters and alternatives. As the Euclidean representation induces a single-peaked
ordering of the alternatives, we will assume by Lemma 5.1 that the alternatives are embedded
in increasing order with
E[1] < E[2] < E[3] < . . . < E[4k − 1] < E[4k]. (3)
Next, we claim that in any Euclidean representation under (3), the embedded alternatives
satisfy the following system of inequalities:
E[2k + 2i− 1] + E[2i] < E[2k + 2i] + E[2i− 1] for 1 ≤ i ≤ k (4a)
E[2k + 2i] + E[2i + 1] < E[2k + 2i− 1] + E[2i + 2] for 1 ≤ i ≤ k − 1 (4b)
E[4k] + E[1] < E[4k − 1] + E[2] (4c)
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The correctness of this system can be seen as follows. For each i = 1, . . . , k, voter v2i−1 ranks
2k + 2i− 1 ≻ 2i and 2i− 1 ≻ 2k + 2i, which by Proposition 2.4 yields
1
2
(E[2k + 2i− 1] + E[2i]) < F [2i− 1] <
1
2
(E[2k + 2i] + E[2i− 1]) ,
which in turn implies (4a). Similarly, for i = 1, . . . , k − 1 voter v2i ranks 2i+ 2 ≻ 2k + 2i− 1
and 2k + 2i ≻ 2i+ 1 which leads to (4b). Finally, voter v2k ranks 2 ≻ 4k − 1 and 4k ≻ 1,
which implies (4c). This establishes correctness of the system (4a)–(4c). By adding up all the
inequalities in (4a)–(4c), we derive the contradiction
∑
4k
x=1E[x] <
∑
4k
x=1E[x]. 
6 Definition of the Euclidean representations
In this section, we fix an integer s with 1 ≤ s ≤ 2k and construct corresponding Euclidean
embeddings Fs and Es of the voters and alternatives in profile P
∗
k . We start by defining the
Euclidean embedding Es of the alternatives. We anchor the embedding by placing the first
alternative at the position
Es[1] = 0. (5)
The remaining values Es[2], . . . , Es[4k] are described recursively in equations (6)–(11) below.
For 1 ≤ i ≤ k − 1 we set
Es[2i+ 1]−Es[2i] = 2 (6)
and for 1 ≤ i ≤ k we set
Es[2i]− Es[2i− 1] = (4i − 2s− 3 mod 4k). (7)
Note that the relations (5)–(7) determine Es[x] for all x ≤ 2k. For 1 ≤ i ≤ k − 1 we set
Es[2k + 2i− 1]− Es[2k + 2i− 2]
=
{
Es[2k + 2i− 3]− Es[2i+ 1] + 2 if s 6= 2i− 1
Es[2k + 2i− 3]− Es[2i+ 2] + 2 if s = 2i− 1.
(8)
For 1 ≤ i ≤ k − 1 we define
Es[2k + 2i]− Es[2k + 2i− 1] = (4i− 2s− 1 mod 4k). (9)
Note that the relations (8) and (9) determine Es[x] for all x with 2k+1 ≤ x ≤ 4k−2. Finally,
we determine the Euclidean embedding of the last two alternatives by defining
Es[4k − 1]− Es[4k − 2] =
{
Es[4k − 3]− Es[2] + 2 if s 6= 2k
Es[4k − 3]− Es[2k + 1] + 2 if s = 2k
(10)
and
Es[4k]− Es[4k − 1] =
{
Es[2]− Es[1]− 2 if s 6= 2k
Es[2k + 1]− Es[2k − 1] if s = 2k.
(11)
This completes the description of the Euclidean embedding Es of the alternatives. Note that
Es[x] is integer for all alternatives x.
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Lemma 6.1 The embedding Es satisfies Es[x] < Es[y] for all alternatives x and y with
1 ≤ x < y ≤ 4k. In other words, Es satisfies the chain of inequalities in (3).
Proof. The statement follows from (5)–(11) by an easy inductive argument. The right hand
sides in (6), (7) and (9) are all positive. The right hand sides in (8) and (10) can be seen
to be positive by induction. Finally for i = 1 and s 6= 2k, the right hand side of (7) is a
positive odd integer strictly greater than 1; this yields Es[2] ≥ 3 so that also the right hand
side Es[2]− Es[1]− 2 in (11) is positive. 
Example 6.2 We continue our discussion of the profile P∗
4
from Example 4.1. For every
embedding Es with 1 ≤ s ≤ 8, the corresponding row in Table 1 lists the distances di =
Es[i]−Es[i− 1] between pairs of consecutive alternatives according to formulas (6)–(11). For
instance the crossing of the row E5 and the column labeled d4 contains an entry with value
11; this means that in the Euclidean representation E5, the distance E5[4]−E5[3] between the
embedded alternatives 3 and 4 equals 11. As Es[1] = 0, we see that for 2 ≤ i ≤ 4k the value
Es[i] then equals d2 + d3 + · · ·+ di. For instance in E5, alternative 4 will be embedded in the
point E5[4] = 7 + 2 + 11 = 20.
The reader will notice that part of the data in Table 1 carries a periodic structure. For
instance every even-indexed column (except the last one) contains a circular shift of the eight
numbers 1, 3, 5, 7, 9, 11, 13, 15 presented in boldface, which results from formulas (7) and (9).
Furthermore, all the entries in the three columns d3, d5, d7 have the same value 2 according
to (6). The numbers in other parts of the table look somewhat irregular and chaotic, which is
caused by formula (8). For us, the most convenient way of working with this data is via the
recursive definitions (5)–(11). 
d2 d3 d4 d5 d6 d7 d8 d9 d10 d11 d12 d13 d14 d15 d16
E1 15 2 3 2 7 2 11 13 1 35 5 62 9 145 13
E2 13 2 1 2 5 2 9 12 15 30 3 68 7 151 11
E3 11 2 15 2 3 2 7 24 13 35 1 81 5 187 9
E4 9 2 13 2 1 2 5 20 11 30 15 68 3 171 7
E5 7 2 11 2 15 2 3 32 9 54 13 97 1 242 5
E6 5 2 9 2 13 2 1 28 7 46 11 84 15 207 3
E7 3 2 7 2 11 2 15 24 5 54 9 100 13 233 1
E8 1 2 5 2 9 2 13 20 3 46 7 84 11 142 33
Table 1: This table is discussed in Example 6.2 and illustrates the Euclidean embedding of
the alternatives in profile P∗
4
. Every row is labeled by a corresponding embedding Es. If a
column is labeled by di, then its entries indicate the Euclidean distances Es[i] − Es[i − 1]
between the two consecutively embedded alternatives i− 1 and i.
Now let us turn to the Euclidean embedding of the voters. The Euclidean position Fs[j]
of every voter vj will be the average of exactly four embedded alternatives. For 1 ≤ i ≤ k− 1
10
we define
Fs[2i− 1] =
1
4
(Es[2i − 1] + Es[2i] + Es[2k + 2i− 1] + Es[2k + 2i]) . (12)
Similarly, for 1 ≤ i ≤ k − 1 we define
Fs[2i] =
1
4
(Es[2i+ 1] + Es[2i+ 2] + Es[2k + 2i− 1] + Es[2k + 2i]) . (13)
If s 6= 2k then voter v2k−1 is embedded according to (12), while for s = 2k it is embedded in
a slightly different way. More precisely, we set
Fs[2k − 1] =
{
1
4
(Es[2k − 1] + Es[2k] +Es[4k − 1] + Es[4k]) if s 6= 2k
1
4
(Es[2k − 2] + Es[2k + 1] + Es[4k − 1] + Es[4k]) if s = 2k.
(14)
Finally, the very last voter v2k is embedded in
Fs[2k] =
1
4
(Es[1] + Es[2] + Es[4k − 1] + Es[4k]) . (15)
Equations (12)–(15) define Fs[j] for all voters vj with 1 ≤ j ≤ 2k. This completes the
description of the Euclidean representation Fs of the voters.
We note that the location Fs[s] of voter vs has been specified, but will be irrelevant for our
further arguments. We will show that Fs and Es constitute a correct Euclidean representation
for the 2k − 1 voters in {v1, . . . , v2k}\{vs} together with all 4k alternatives 1, 2, . . . , 4k. In
other words, the deletion of voter vs from profile P
∗
k yields a one-dimensional Euclidean profile,
which completes the proof of property (b) in Theorem 3.1. To this end, the following lemma
will be established in Section 8.
Lemma 6.3 For all r and s with 1 ≤ r 6= s ≤ 2k, the Euclidean representation Es and Fs
correctly represents the preferences of voter vr.
The correctness of Lemma 6.3 for the small profiles P∗k with k ∈ {2, 3, 4} can easily be
verified by a computer program (or by a human prover through tedious case distinctions).
Hence we will from now on assume that
k ≥ 5. (16)
This assumption will considerably shorten and simplify our arguments. Note furthermore that
the proof of our main result in Theorem 3.2 is not touched by this assumption, as it builds
on the profiles P∗k for which k is large and tends to infinity.
7 A collection of technical results
In this section we state five technical lemmas. Lemmas 7.1 and 7.2 summarize a number
of useful identities, and will serve as reference tables in our later analysis. Lemmas 7.3
through 7.5 state important inequalities that will be central to our proofs. Throughout we
assume that k ≥ 5 according to (16).
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Lemma 7.1 For 1 ≤ s ≤ 2k, the Euclidean embedding Es satisfies the following.
Es[2] = 4k − 2s+ 1 (17a)
Es[3] = 4k − 2s+ 3 (17b)
Es[4] =
{
4k − 4s + 8 if s ∈ {1, 2}
8k − 4s + 8 if s ≥ 3.
(17c)
Furthermore for s ∈ {1, 2}, the embedding Es satisfies the following.
Es[2k − 2]− Es[2k − 3] = 4k − 2s− 7 (18a)
Es[2k − 4]− Es[2k − 5] = 4k − 2s− 11 (18b)
Proof. These statements follow by straightforward calculations from (5)–(9). 
Lemma 7.2 If (a) 1 ≤ i ≤ k − 1 and s 6= 2i − 1, or if (b) i = k and s /∈ {2k − 1, 2k}, the
following holds:
Es[2k + 2i]− Es[2k + 2i− 1] = Es[2i] − Es[2i− 1] + 2 (19a)
If (c) 1 ≤ i ≤ k − 1 and s 6= 2i, the following holds:
Es[2k + 2i]− Es[2k + 2i− 1] = Es[2i + 2]− Es[2i+ 1]− 2 (19b)
Proof. We distinguish five cases. The first case assumes s = 2i − 1. In the setting of the
lemma, this case can only occur under (c) with 1 ≤ i ≤ k − 1. Then (9) yields Es[2k + 2i] −
Es[2k + 2i − 1] = 1, while (7) yields Es[2i + 2] − Es[2i + 1] = 3. This implies the desired
equality (19b) for this first case.
The second case assumes s = 2i. In the setting of the lemma, this case can only occur
under (a) with 1 ≤ i ≤ k − 1. Then (9) yields Es[2k + 2i] − Es[2k + 2i − 1] = 4k − 1, while
(7) yields Es[2i] − Es[2i− 1] = 4k − 3. This implies the desired equality (19a).
The third case assumes i = k. In the setting of the lemma, this case can only occur under
(b) with 1 ≤ s ≤ 2k − 2. Then (11) and (17a) yield Es[4k] − Es[4k − 1] = 4k − 2s − 1, while
(7) yields Es[2k] − Es[2k − 1] = 4k − 2s− 3. This implies the desired equality (19a).
In the remaining cases we always have s /∈ {2i − 1, 2i}. The fourth case assumes that
1 ≤ i ≤ k − 1 and that s = 2ℓ − 1 is odd, where 1 ≤ ℓ ≤ k and ℓ 6= i. In the setting of the
lemma, this case can only occur under (a) and (c). Then (9) yields
Es[2k + 2i]− Es[2k + 2i− 1] = 4(i− ℓ) + 1 mod 4k, (20)
while (7) yields Es[2i]−Es[2i− 1] = 4(i− ℓ)− 1 mod 4k. Since i− ℓ 6= 0, these two equations
together yield (19a). Furthermore, (7) yields Es[2i + 2] − Es[2i + 1] = 4(i − ℓ) + 3 mod 4k,
which together with (20) gives (19b).
The fifth case assumes that 1 ≤ i ≤ k − 1 and that s = 2ℓ is even, where 1 ≤ ℓ ≤ k and
ℓ 6= i. In the setting of the lemma, this case can only occur under (a) and (c). Then (9) yields
Es[2k + 2i]− Es[2k + 2i− 1] = 4(i− ℓ)− 1 mod 4k, (21)
while (7) yields Es[2i]−Es[2i−1] = 4(i− ℓ)−3 mod 4k. Since i− ℓ 6= 0, these two statements
together imply (19a). Finally, (7) yields Es[2i + 2] − Es[2i + 1] = 4(i − ℓ) + 1 mod 4k. As
i− ℓ 6= 0, this equation together with (21) yields (19b). This completes the proof. 
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Lemma 7.3 For all alternatives x and y with 1 ≤ y ≤ x ≤ 4k, the embedding Es satisfies
the inequality Es[x]− Es[y] ≥ x− y.
Proof. This follows from Lemma 6.1 and the integrality of Es. 
Lemma 7.4 All i and s with 1 ≤ i ≤ 2k − 1 and 1 ≤ s ≤ 2k satisfy the following inequality.
Es[2i+ 1]−Es[2i] ≥ 2. (22)
Proof. For 1 ≤ i ≤ k− 1, this follows directly from (6). For k ≤ i ≤ 2k − 1, this follows from
(8) and (10) in combination with Lemma 7.3. 
Lemma 7.5 All i and s with 1 ≤ i ≤ k − 1 and 1 ≤ s ≤ 2k satisfy the following inequality.
Es[2k + 2i− 1] ≥ Es[2k] + Es[2i] + 2. (23)
Proof. The proof is done by induction on i = 1, . . . , k − 1. For the inductive base case i = 1
we distinguish two subcases on the value of s. The first subcase assumes s ∈ {1, 2}. Then (8)
and k ≥ 5, together with (6), (18a), (18b), and (17a) yield
Es[2k + 2i− 1]− Es[2k] ≥ Es[2k − 1]− Es[4] + 2
≥ (Es[2k − 1]−Es[2k − 2]) + (Es[2k − 2]− Es[2k − 3])
+(Es[2k − 3]− Es[2k − 4]) + (Es[2k − 4]− Es[2k − 5]) + 2
= 2 + (4k − 2s− 7) + 2 + (4k − 2s− 11) + 2
= 8k − 4s− 12 > (4k − 2s+ 1) + 2 = Es[2] + 2.
The second subcase assumes s ≥ 3. Then the first line of (8) together with k ≥ 5, (17c), (17b)
and (17a) yields
Es[2k + 2i− 1]− Es[2k] = Es[2k − 1]− Es[3] + 2
≥ Es[4]− Es[3] + 2 = (8k − 4s+ 8)− (4k − 2s+ 3) + 2
= 4k − 2s+ 7 > Es[2] + 2.
Summarizing, in both subcases we have established the desired (23). This completes the
analysis of the inductive base case i = 1. Next, let us state the inductive assumption as
Es[2k + 2i− 3] ≥ Es[2k] + Es[2i− 2] + 2. (24)
In the inductive step, we will use the following consequence of (8):
Es[2k + 2i− 1]− Es[2k + 2i− 2] ≥ Es[2k + 2i− 3]− Es[2i+ 2] + 2. (25)
Furthermore, by (9) the left hand side of the following inequality equals (4i− 2s− 5 mod 4k),
while by (7) its right hand side equals (4i− 2s− 3 mod 4k) − 2. This implies
Es[2k + 2i− 2]− Es[2k + 2i− 3] ≥ Es[2i] − Es[2i− 1]− 2. (26)
Adding up (24), (25) and (26), and rearranging and simplifying the resulting inequality yields
Es[2k + 2i− 1]− Es[2k]− Es[2i] − 2
≥ Es[2k + 2i− 3]− Es[2i+ 2] + Es[2i− 2]− Es[2i− 1]
≥ (2k + 2i− 3)− (2i + 2)− 2 = 2k − 7 > 0.
Here we used Lemma 7.3 to bound Es[2k + 2i− 3]−Es[2i+ 2], and we used (6) to get rid of
Es[2i− 2]− Es[2i− 1]. As this implies (23), the inductive argument is complete. 
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8 Correctness of the Euclidean representations
In this section we prove Lemma 6.3. Hence, let us fix two arbitrary voters vr and vs with
r 6= s. We recall that by Lemma 6.1 the Euclidean representation Es embeds the alternatives
1, . . . , 4k in increasing order from left to right. Our goal is to show that any two alternatives
x and y with x ≻r y that are consecutive in the preference order of voter vr satisfy
2Fs[r] < Es[x] + Es[y] whenever x < y (27a)
2Fs[r] > Es[x] + Es[y] whenever x > y. (27b)
By our construction, all preference orders in profile P∗k contain long monotone (increasing or
decreasing) runs of alternatives. By Proposition 2.5 it will therefore be sufficient to establish
(27a) and (27b) at the few turning points where the preference order of voter vr changes its
monotonicity behavior. We stress that the first pair of alternatives in every preference order
forms a turning point by default.
The remaining argument is split into four cases that will be handled in the following four
sections. Sections 8.1 and 8.2 treat the cases with odd r, while Sections 8.3 and 8.4 treat the
cases with even r.
8.1 The cases with odd r (with a single exception)
In this section we consider the cases with odd r = 2i − 1 for 1 ≤ i ≤ k, and with s 6= 2i − 1.
If i = k (and hence r = 2k − 1) then we additionally assume s 6= 2k; the remaining case with
i = k and s = 2k will be settled in the next section. Note that in the cases under current
consideration, the value Fs[2i− 1] is given by (12). Furthermore (19a) in Lemma 7.2 yields
Es[2k + 2i] + Es[2i− 1] = Es[2i] + Es[2k + 2i− 1] + 2. (28)
In order to prove (27a) and (27b) for the preference orders in (1a) and (2a), it is sufficient to
establish the following six inequalities for the turning points.
2Fs[2i − 1] > Es[2k + 2i− 2] + Es[2k + 2i− 3] (29a)
2Fs[2i − 1] < Es[2i+ 1] + Es[2k + 2i− 1] (29b)
2Fs[2i − 1] > Es[2k + 2i− 1] + Es[2i] (29c)
2Fs[2i − 1] < Es[2i− 1] + Es[2k + 2i] (29d)
2Fs[2i − 1] > Es[2k + 2i] + Es[2i− 2] (29e)
2Fs[2i − 1] < Es[1] + Es[2k + 2i+ 1] (29f)
Note that for i = 1 the inequality in (29e) vanishes as piece Y1 is empty, and that for i = k
inequality (29f) vanishes as piece Zk is empty. We use (12) or the first line of (14) together
with (28), and rewrite the common left hand side of all inequalities (29a)–(29f) as
2Fs[2i − 1] =
1
2
(Es[2i − 1] +Es[2i] + Es[2k + 2i− 1] + Es[2k + 2i])
= Es[2i] + Es[2k + 2i− 1] + 1 = Es[2i− 1] + Es[2k + 2i]− 1. (30)
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For (29a), we distinguish two subcases. The first subcase assumes i ≤ k − 1. We compute by
using (30), (8) with s 6= 2i− 1, and (6) that
2Fs[2i − 1]− Es[2k + 2i− 2]− Es[2k + 2i− 3]
= (Es[2i] + Es[2k + 2i− 1] + 1)− Es[2k + 2i− 2]− Es[2k + 2i− 3]
= Es[2i] + 1− Es[2i+ 1] + 2 = 1 > 0.
The second subcase deals with the remaining case i = k. We use (30), the first line in (10),
and Lemma 6.1 to compute
2Fs[2i − 1]− Es[2k + 2i− 2]− Es[2k + 2i− 3]
= (Es[2k] + Es[4k − 1] + 1)− Es[4k − 2]− Es[4k − 3]
= (Es[2k] + 1) + (−Es[2] + 2) = (Es[2k]− Es[2]) + 3 > 0.
For (29b), we compute by using (30) and (22) that
2Fs[2i − 1]− Es[2i+ 1]− Es[2k + 2i− 1]
= (Es[2i] + Es[2k + 2i− 1] + 1)− Es[2i + 1]− Es[2k + 2i− 1] < 0.
For (29c), we compute by using (30) that
2Fs[2i − 1]− Es[2k + 2i− 1]− Es[2i]
= (Es[2i] + Es[2k + 2i− 1] + 1)− Es[2k + 2i− 1]− Es[2i] = 1 > 0.
For (29d), we compute by using (30) that
2Fs[2i − 1]− Es[2i− 1]− Es[2k + 2i]
= (Es[2i− 1] + Es[2k + 2i] − 1)− Es[2i − 1]− Es[2k + 2i] = − 1 < 0.
For (29e) with i ≥ 2, we compute by using (30) and (6) that
2Fs[2i − 1]− Es[2k + 2i]− Es[2i− 2]
= (Es[2i− 1] + Es[2k + 2i] − 1)− Es[2k + 2i] − Es[2i − 2] = 1 > 0.
It remains to prove inequality (29f) which takes more effort. Since (29f) vanishes for i = k,
we may assume i ≤ k − 1. We first use (30) and (5) to derive
2Fs[2i − 1]− Es[1]− Es[2k + 2i+ 1]
= Es[2i − 1]− 1− (Es[2k + 2i+ 1]− Es[2k + 2i]). (31)
Our goal is to show that the value in (31) is strictly negative, and for this we branch into
three subcases. The first subcase assumes i ≤ k − 2. We use (8), (23), and Lemma 6.1 to
compute
Es[2i− 1]− 1− (Es[2k + 2i+ 1]− Es[2k + 2i])
≤ Es[2i − 1]− 1− (Es[2k + 2i− 1]− Es[2i+ 4] + 2)
≤ Es[2i − 1]− 3 + Es[2i+ 4]− (Es[2k] + Es[2i] + 2)
= (Es[2i+ 4]− Es[2k]) + (Es[2i − 1]− Es[2i]) − 5 < 0.
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The second subcase assumes i = k − 1 and s 6= 2k. We use (10), (23), and Lemma 6.1 to
compute
Es[2i− 1]− 1− (Es[2k + 2i+ 1]− Es[2k + 2i])
= Es[2k − 3]− 1− (Es[4k − 1]− Es[4k − 2])
= Es[2k − 3]− 1− (Es[4k − 3]− Es[2] + 2)
≤ Es[2k − 3]− 3 + Es[2]− (Es[2k] + Es[2k − 2] + 2)
= (Es[2k − 3]−Es[2k]) + (Es[2]− Es[2k − 2])− 5 < 0.
The third and last subcase assumes i = k− 1 and s = 2k. We use the second line of (10), the
first line of (8), inequality (23), equation (6), and Lemma 6.1 to compute
Es[2i− 1]− 1− (Es[2k + 2i+ 1]− Es[2k + 2i])
= Es[2k − 3]− 1− (Es[4k − 1]− Es[4k − 2])
= Es[2k − 3]− 1− (Es[4k − 3]− Es[2k + 1] + 2)
= Es[2k − 3]− 3 + Es[2k + 1]− (Es[4k − 4] +Es[4k − 5]− Es[2k − 1] + 2)
≤ Es[2k − 3]− 5 + Es[2k + 1]− Es[4k − 4]
+Es[2k − 1]− (Es[2k] + Es[2k − 4] + 2)
= (Es[2k + 1]−Es[4k − 4]) + (Es[2k − 1]− Es[2k]) − 5 < 0.
As (31) is strictly negative in each of the three subcases, the proof of (29f) is complete. The
Euclidean representation Es and Fs correctly represents the preferences of voter vr.
8.2 The exceptional case with odd r
In this section we consider the exceptional case i = k (and hence r = 2k − 1) under s = 2k,
which has been left open in the preceding section. In this exceptional case, the embedding
Fs[2k − 1] is given by the second option in formula (14). Furthermore, (11) and (6) yield
Es[4k]− Es[4k − 1] = Es[2k + 1]− Es[2k − 2]− 2.
Altogether this leads to
2Fs[2k − 1] =
1
2
(Es[2k − 2] + Es[2k + 1] + Es[4k − 1] + Es[4k])
= Es[2k − 2] + Es[4k] + 1 = Es[2k + 1] +Es[4k − 1]− 1. (32)
As inequality (29f) vanishes for i = k, our goal in this section is to establish the five inequalities
(29a)–(29e) for i = k and s = 2k. For (29a), we compute by using (32) and (10) that
2Fs[2k − 1]− Es[4k − 2]− Es[4k − 3]
= (Es[2k + 1] +Es[4k − 1]− 1)− Es[4k − 2]− Es[4k − 3]
= Es[2k + 1]− Es[4k − 3]− 1 + (Es[4k − 3]−Es[2k + 1] + 2) = 1 > 0.
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For (29b), we compute by using (32) that
2Fs[2k − 1]− Es[2k + 1]− Es[4k − 1]
= (Es[2k + 1] +Es[4k − 1]− 1)− Es[2k + 1]− Es[4k − 1] = − 1 < 0.
For (29c), we compute by using (32) and (22) that
2Fs[2k − 1]− Es[4k − 1]− Es[2k]
= (Es[2k + 1] +Es[4k − 1]− 1)− Es[4k − 1]− Es[2k] > 0.
For (29d), we compute by using (32) and (6) that
2Fs[2k − 1]− Es[2k − 1]− Es[4k]
= (Es[2k − 2] +Es[4k] + 1)− Es[2k − 1]− Es[4k] = − 1 < 0.
For (29e), we compute by using (32) that
2Fs[2k − 1]− Es[4k]− Es[2k − 2]
= (Es[2k − 2] +Es[4k] + 1)− Es[4k] − Es[2k − 2] = 1 > 0.
This completes the analysis of the exceptional case with odd r. Also in this case, the repre-
sentation Es and Fs correctly represents the preferences of the considered voter.
8.3 The cases with even r (with a single exception)
In this section we consider the cases with even r = 2i for 1 ≤ i ≤ k − 1, and with s 6= 2i.
The remaining case r = 2k will be settled in the next section. Note that in the cases under
consideration, the value Fs[2i] is given by (13). Furthermore (19b) in Lemma 7.2 yields
Es[2i+ 1] +Es[2k + 2i] = Es[2i+ 2] + Es[2k + 2i− 1]− 2. (33)
In order to prove (27a) and (27b) for the preference orders in (1b), it is sufficient to establish
the following four inequalities for the turning points.
2Fs[2i] > Es[2k + 2i− 2] + Es[2k + 2i− 3] (34a)
2Fs[2i] < Es[2i + 2] + Es[2k + 2i− 1] (34b)
2Fs[2i] > Es[2k + 2i] +Es[2i + 1] (34c)
2Fs[2i] < Es[1] + Es[2k + 2i+ 1] (34d)
We use the definition of Fs[2i] in (13) together with (33) to rewrite the common left hand
side of all inequalities (34a)–(34d) as
2Fs[2i] =
1
2
(Es[2i+ 1] + Es[2i+ 2] + Es[2k + 2i− 1] + Es[2k + 2i])
= Es[2i+ 1] + Es[2k + 2i] + 1 = Es[2i+ 2] + Es[2k + 2i− 1]− 1. (35)
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For (34a), we compute by using (35) and (8) that
2Fs[2i] − Es[2k + 2i− 2]− Es[2k + 2i− 3]
= (Es[2i+ 2] + Es[2k + 2i− 1]− 1)− Es[2k + 2i− 2]− Es[2k + 2i− 3]
≥ Es[2i + 2]− Es[2k + 2i− 3]− 1 + (Es[2k + 2i− 3]− Es[2i+ 2] + 2) = 1 > 0.
For (34b), we compute by using (35) that
2Fs[2i] − Es[2i+ 2]− Es[2k + 2i− 1]
= (Es[2i+ 2] + Es[2k + 2i− 1]− 1)− Es[2i+ 2]− Es[2k + 2i− 1] = −1 < 0.
For (34c), we compute by using (35) that
2Fs[2i] − Es[2k + 2i]− Es[2i+ 1]
= (Es[2i+ 1] + Es[2k + 2i] + 1)− Es[2k + 2i] − Es[2i + 1] = 1 > 0.
It remains to prove inequality (34d) which takes a considerable amount of work. We
branch into three subcases. The first subcase assumes 1 ≤ i ≤ k−2. Then Lemma 6.1 implies
Es[2i+ 4] ≤ Es[2k]. We use (35), (5), (8), (23) and (6) to derive
2Fs[2i] − Es[1]− Es[2k + 2i+ 1]
= (Es[2i+ 1] + Es[2k + 2i] + 1)− Es[2k + 2i+ 1]
≤ Es[2i + 1] + 1− (Es[2k + 2i− 1]− Es[2i+ 4] + 2)
≤ Es[2i + 1] + Es[2i+ 4]− 1− (Es[2k] + Es[2i] + 2)
= Es[2i + 4]− Es[2k]− 1 < 0.
The second subcase assumes i = k − 1 and s 6= 2k. For proving (34d), we compute by
using (35), (5), (10), (23) and (6) that
2Fs[2k − 2]− Es[1]− Es[4k − 1]
= (Es[2k − 1] +Es[4k − 2] + 1)− Es[4k − 1]
= Es[2k − 1] + 1− (Es[4k − 3]− Es[2] + 2)
≤ Es[2k − 1] + Es[2]− 1− (Es[2k] + Es[2k − 2] + 2)
= Es[2]− Es[2k] − 1 < 0.
The third and last subcase finally assumes i = k− 1 and s = 2k. We start the analysis by
deriving a number of auxiliary equations and inequalities. First we determine Es[3] = 3 from
(17b), and compute by using (8) and (6) that
Es[2k + 1]− Es[2k − 2]
= (Es[2k + 1]−Es[2k]) + (Es[2k] −Es[2k − 1]) + (Es[2k − 1]− Es[2k − 2])
= (Es[2k − 1]−Es[3] + 2) + (Es[2k]− Es[2k − 1]) + 2 = Es[2k] + 1. (36)
Next, we use (19b) to derive
Es[2k − 2]− Es[2k − 3]− 2 = Es[4k − 4]− Es[4k − 5]. (37)
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We express Es[4k − 3] once by the first line of (8) and once by the second line of (10), which
by equating yields
Es[4k − 4] + Es[4k − 5]− Es[2k − 1] + 2
= Es[2k + 1]− 2 + Es[4k − 1]− Es[4k − 2]. (38)
Next, we add up (36), (37), (38) and rearrange the result to derive
Es[2k − 1] + Es[4k − 2]− Es[4k − 1] + 1
= 2Es[2k − 1] + Es[2k] + Es[2k − 3]− 2Es[4k − 5]. (39)
We compute Es[2k]−Es[2k− 1] = 4k− 3 and Es[2k− 2]−Es[2k − 3] = 4k− 7 from (7), and
use these together with (6) to get
Es[2k − 1]− Es[2k − 4] + Es[2k − 1]− Es[2k]
= (Es[2k − 2] + 2)− (Es[2k − 3]− 2)− (Es[2k]− Es[2k − 1])
= 2 + (4k − 7) + 2− (4k − 3) = 0. (40)
Now for finally proving (34d) in this third and last subcase, we compute by using (35), (5),
(39), (23), (40) and (6) that
2Fs[2k − 2]− Es[1]− Es[4k − 1]
= (Es[2k − 1] +Es[4k − 2] + 1)− Es[4k − 1]
= 2Es[2k − 1] + Es[2k] + Es[2k − 3]− 2Es[4k − 5]
≤ 2Es[2k − 1] + Es[2k] + Es[2k − 3]− 2(Es[2k] + Es[2k − 4] + 2)
= Es[2k − 3]− Es[2k − 4]− 4 = − 2 < 0.
This completes the proof of inequality (34d). Summarizing, the representation Es and Fs
correctly represents the preferences of the considered voter vr.
8.4 The exceptional case with even r
In this section we consider the last remaining case with even r, where r = 2k and s 6= 2k
holds. In order to prove (27a) and (27b) for the preference orders in (2b), it is sufficient to
establish the following three inequalities for the turning points.
2Fs[2k] > Es[4k − 2] + Es[4k − 3] (41a)
2Fs[2k] < Es[2] + Es[4k − 1] (41b)
2Fs[2k] > Es[4k] +Es[1] (41c)
The definition of Fs[2k] in (15) and (11) with s 6= 2k yield for the common left hand side of
(41a)–(41c) that
2Fs[2k] =
1
2
(Es[1] + Es[2] + Es[4k − 1] + Es[4k])
= Es[4k] + Es[1] + 1 = Es[4k − 1] + Es[2]− 1. (42)
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For (41a), we compute by using (42) and (10) with s 6= 2k that
2Fs[2k] − Es[4k − 2]− Es[4k − 3]
= (Es[4k − 1] +Es[2] − 1)− Es[4k − 2]− Es[4k − 3]
= Es[2]− Es[4k − 3]− 1 + (Es[4k − 3]− Es[2] + 2) = 1 > 0.
For (41b), we compute by using (42) that
2Fs[2k] − Es[2] − Es[4k − 1]
= (Es[4k − 1] +Es[2] − 1)− Es[2]− Es[4k − 1] = − 1 < 0.
For (41c), we compute by using (42) that
2Fs[2k] − Es[4k] + Es[1]
= (Es[4k] + Es[1] + 1)− Es[4k]− Es[1] = 1 > 0.
This settles the last case. The proof of Lemma 6.3 and with it the proof of Theorem 3.1 are
finally complete.
9 Conclusions
We have shown that one-dimensional Euclidean preference profiles can not be characterized in
terms of finitely many obstructions. This is similar to the situation of interval graphs, which
also can not be characterized by finitely many obstructions. For interval graphs, however,
we have a full understanding of all the obstructions that are minimal with respect to vertex
deletion; see Lekkerkerker & Boland [27]. In a similar vein, it would be interesting to deter-
mine all the (infinitely many) obstructions for one-dimensional Euclidean preferences that are
minimal with respect to deletion of voters or alternatives. At the current moment, we have
no idea of what these minimal obstructions would look like.
With respect to general d-dimensional Euclidean preference profiles, we feel that the situ-
ation should be analogous to the one-dimensional situation: we conjecture that for any fixed
value of d ≥ 2, there will be no characterization of d-dimensional Euclidean profiles through
finitely many obstructions. However, we see no realistic way of generalizing our current ap-
proach to the higher-dimensional situations, and we leave this as an open problem. (We
remind the reader that in a d-dimensional Euclidean preference profile the voters and alter-
natives are embedded in d-dimensional Euclidean space, so that small distance corresponds
to strong preference; see for instance Bogomolnaia & Laslier [5].)
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